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Gibson: Gibson: Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment

CONFIDENTIALITY IN
MEDIATION: A MORAL
REASSESSMENT
Kevin Gibson*

To whom you tell your secrets, to him you resign your liberty.
Spanish Proverb
I find the issue of confidentiality fascinating. When the Ethics
Committee discussed confidentiality, we each had slightly different
meanings. Labor mediators were most insistent on talking of
confidentiality in absolute terms, but most flexible when it came to
defining it. In the community field, confidentiality has so many facets.
We have to break them down in our training sessions. The [Society of
Professionalsin Dispute Resolution] standardsaddress confidentiality
as if we are all taking about the same thing when I think there are overt
and subtle variations which need to be explored.'
Albie Davis
I. INTRODUCTION
In maintaining client confidentiality, mediators may find a conflict between
common morality and their role morality. It is sometimes said that mediators
should never breach client confidentiality 2 and yet there will be cases where
mediators will want to disclose information given in the mediation session.' In
this article, I will examine confidentiality by looking at the present state of
mediation, and some of the legal justifications that are presented. I will then
discuss each of important suppositions involved in legal justification. While these
suppositions are often taken cumulatively, I believe that it is worthwhile to test the

* Research Associate, Center for the Study of Values and Social Policy, University of Colorado,
Boulder. B.A. (Hons) Sussex University, U.K., 1980; Ed.M. Harvard University, 1985; Ph.D.
University of Colorado, Boulder, 1991. Mediator, CDR Associates, Boulder. This paper has been
made possible by a grant from the University of Colorado Conflict Resolution Consortium.
1. NATIONAL INSTITTE FOR DIsPurE RESOLUTION, DIsPurE RESOLUTION FORUM 3 (1987) (Albie
Davis is the director of the mediation project in the District Court Department of the Trial Court of
Massachusetts).
2. See, e.g., Freedman & Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO
ST. J. DisP. RESOL 37, 37 (1986).
3. Such cases might include the need for public accountability, threats made within the mediation,
reports of criminal activity, planned crimes, abuse to children, the elderly or other unempowered
groups, and "whistleblowing". See infra text accompanying notes 161-99.
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weight each one carries as a component in justification. I will present arguments
for the positions taken with respect to confidentiality. Although reasonable people
will differ in the importance that they place on various arguments and values, and
therefore they may reach different conclusions, I believe that the form of
justification will remain fairly constant. I will then present four cases where I
contend breaching confidentiality is merited.
I will argue that there should be many more cases where confidentiality may
be broken, and there should be greater provision for external review. I contend
that for mediation to be effective some degree of confidentiality may be required,
but it is wrong to assume that mediation needs absolute confidentiality.
II. SCOPE
In discussing mediation confidentiality, it appears that different commentators
address different issues. For example, some commentaries discuss only courtordered mediation4 while others consider the possibility of any intervention by a
neutral to be mediation, and hence under scrutiny. There is also disagreement
about what should be protected: pre-mediation screening calls, post session
discussions among mediators and their supervisors and so on.5 In order to keep
the discussion as broad and inclusive as possible, I will use "mediation" to refer
to any organized intervention by an impartial third party and to any part of that
process. Although some may consider this term to be too broad, I believe that my
conclusions apply extensively.

III. WHAT IS AT ISSUE?
Disclosure of private information can make a negotiator vulnerable, since
traditional bargaining gambits require minimum disclosure, bluffing and posturing.
In "positional bargaining" exposing a real "bottom line" or the actual rather than
perceived leverage over the other party might weaken any subsequent bargaining
position.' In litigation, a party will attempt to conceal any private facts which
may compromise his or her case or which may serve to divulge proprietary
information. Moreover, there may be personal reasons for someone to avoid
publicity: particular affinities for individuals or groups which influence a
supposedly impartial decision, reluctance to make public the details of events

4. See, e.g., Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring

Fairness, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1089 (1990).
5. See, e.g., N. ROGERS & C. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 114-25 (1989);
BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON

see also Murphy, Mediation and the Duty to Disclose, in AMERICAN

DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MEDIATION AND THE DurY TO DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION:
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 89 (1985).

6. See, e.g., T. WARSCHAW, WINNING BY NEGOTIATION 124-26 (1980).
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leading to a divorce, or the presence of a motive such as revenge that is usually
subject to moral censure. 7
Effective mediation using interest-based bargaining may require the disputants
to make candid revelations of their real issues and interests either in private to the
mediator, or in front of the other party To encourage openness and to give
clients a degree of protection, a mediator will promise to uphold confidentiality.
Although such a promise may expedite any particular negotiation, there are
nevertheless two strong reasons why the details of a mediation session should not
be kept completely confidential. First, if the process is allowed to go on without
any sort of review, then it lacks public accountability. Unfair procedures may lead
to unfair outcomes, applicable rights may be infringed, and a client may come
away from the mediation far worse off than if he or she had gone to court.
Secondly, if there are unrepresented but concerned parties who have a right to
know or a duty to be warned about something introduced in mediation, then there
is a pull towards breaking confidentiality.
IV. A DEFINITION OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that confidentiality refers to imparting
"private or secret matters to another" or "the relation of intimacy or trust between
persons so confiding." 9 Accordingly, confidentiality in mediation contains two
aspects, one which deals with information garnered during mediation, and the
other which deals with a special relationship of trust between the mediator and
disputants. This distinction is not often drawn, but reflects a significant difference
in approach by mediators. Not all mediators stress each element. Some feel that
there is something so special about the relationship that it should be held
paramount, as Lovenheim does when he makes the claim "the absolute
requirement of confidentiality places on the mediator the same pressures that a
priest has regarding confession and a lawyer has with a client."1 ° "Others take

7. See Restivo & Mangus, Alternative Dispute Resolution: ConfidentialProblem-Solving Or Every
Man's Evidence? 2 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 2, 5 (1984).

Restivo and

Mangus suggest that ADR is an appropriate forum for disputes where the parties wish to avoid public
scrutiny, and that the confidentiality of mediation is a significant factor in attracting clients. Id. at 5.
As I shall argue, the efficiency of settlements by confidential dispute resolution procedures is not in
itself sufficient reason to warrant immunity from public accountability.
8. See, e.g., Lake Utopia Paper, Ltd., v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1979); Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 2, at 38. The Lake Utopia
court comments:
If participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of everything that transpires during
these sessions then counsel of necessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a
cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to poker players in a high
stakes game than to adversaries attempting to arrive at a just solution of a civil dispute.
608 F.2d at 930; see also N. ROGERS & C. MCEWEN, supra note 5, at 99.
9. OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 511 (1971).
10. P. LOVENHEIM, MEDIATE DON'T LITIGATE 34 (1989).
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the relationship to be chiefly one of expedience in achieving settlements."" "An
'expedient' mediator is less likely to revere the relationship and may thus be more
12
willing to breach confidentiality.'
V. PRESENT PERCEPTIONS
There are many options open to the mediator with regard to the
confidentiality of the session. At one extreme, the session can be thought of as
completely sealed, and at the other it could be open and reportable. Mediation
clients are often given the impression that everything that transpires in a mediation
session is confidential and immune from any investigation. 3 For instance,
Lovenheim boldly announces:
There is no duty of the mediator greater than the duty to preserve the
confidentiality of everything revealed to him or her during the hearing.
[Mediators] are bound to that duty by the oath of office and by the rules
of the particular center where they work.' 4
But despite the impression clients may have, 5 few mediators are
"absolutists" in the sense that they believe nothing at all should be revealed at any

11. D. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS 41 (1985).
12. Id. Kolb quotes a mediator who believed his role involved times when:
one side needs my help more than another. I come on like a gentleman. I use all the
logic and argument. Then I convince them by persuasion, and then I take them and bang
their heads. Today, if I'm not persuasive enough to get a settlement, there isn't one there.
Id. at 27. The implication, I believe, is that some mediators value making a deal more than preserving
the integrity of the process.
13. See, e.g., L. FREEDMAN, C. HAILE & H. BOOKSTAFF, CONFIDENTIAUTY IN MEDIATION: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 205 (1985). In resisting a sub poena Lauren Burton, director of the
Neighborhood Justice Center in Los Angeles, explained her action to the court and noted that her
program was founded upon an expectation of confidentiality:
The brochure provided to all potential program participants at the outset of their contact
with the Center prominently informs each such participant that the program is
"CONFIDENTIAL". Before the Center accepts any case for mediation, each potential
participant is specifically informed of the Center's policy on confidentiality, and is told
that unless he or she will agree that all information communicated to the Center may be
held in strict confidence and not used for any purpose other than the settlement
discussions conducted by the Center, the Center will refuse to undertake mediation in that
particular case.
Id.
14. P. LOVENHEIM, supra note 10, at 34 & 44.
15. Some evidence suggests that mediation confidentiality is rarely challenged because of the
mistaken impression that the clients have about the operating codes and applicable law. See, e.g., N.
ROGERS & R. SAL.EM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW 68 (1987).
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time or in any circumstances. 6 There is a broad spectrum of opinion about what
should be revealed,1 7 and what kind of justifications there are for breaking the
seal of confidence established in the mediation conference.' 8
Most practitioners tend to share a commitment to resist court subpoena and the
belief that there must be some sort of "escape clause" for exceptional
circumstances-usually taken to mean child abuse or imminent harm. 9 For
instance, the code of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR)
states:
Maintaining confidentiality is critical to the dispute resolution process.
There may be some types of cases, however, in which confidentiality
is not protected. In such cases, the neutral must advise the parties,
when appropriate in the dispute resolution process, that the
confidentiality of the proceedings cannot necessarily be maintained.
Except in such instances, the neutral must resist all attempts to cause
him or her to reveal any information outside the process.20
Although it sounds plausible, this qualification is unhelpful. It does not give us
a criterion for recognizing "some types of cases," and so we have no principled
way of identifying them. It is also unclear when the mediator is under a duty to
withdraw from mediation, and when the mediator has an active duty to report
information.2'

16. I am unaware of any mediators who actually believe that settlement conferences are as
inviolable as a Roman Catholic confessional. Still, some of the language used by commentators gives
this impression. See Rice, Mediation and Arbitration as a Civil Alternative to the Criminal Justice
System - An Overview and Legal Analysis, 29 AM. U.L. REV 17, 81 (1979). Rice says:
[T]he need for confidentiality in the negotiation sessions of the mediation/arbitration
programs is clear. Unless they can assure confidentiality, the programs will be unable to
create the atmosphere of openness that is necessary for successful dispute resolution..
• . It is obvious that only incomplete protection is given to the confidentiality of the
records of these new programs and of the oral communications the programs generate.
Completeprotection can be assured only through legislation that absolutely forbids the
disclosure and use of such information outside the settlement process.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 2, at 38-44. But see Green, A Heretical View of
Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. RESOL 1, 2 (1986).
18. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 2, at 44-45; Green, supra note 17, at 34-36.
19. These clauses are found in many codes of conduct for mediators. See, e.g., The Arizona
Coalition on Dispute Resolution, Draft Rules for Mediator and Mediation Program Certification
Process; Code of Ethics, Conduct and Standards (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter Arizona Code of Ethics];
Colorado Council of Mediation Organizations, Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators 2-8 (Jan.
1982) [hereinafter CCMO Code]; see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985);
MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 400.11(a) (West Supp. 1986).
20. SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS INDIsPuTE RESOLUrION, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY § 3 (1986) [hereinafter SPIDR ETHICAL STANDARDS].
21. SPIDR does have an ethics committee which has the mandate to interpret the standards. It
has not yet ruled on cases where there has been an alternative between withdrawing and reporting of
cases.
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The Colorado Code 2 is more explicit. It provides the following specific
exceptions:
In the event of child abuse by one or more of the disputants or in a case
in which a mediator discovers that a probable crime will be committed
that may result in serious psychological or physical harm to another
person, the mediator is obligated to report these actions to the
appropriate agencies.'
Here we are told that there is an active duty to disclose; however, the code
suggests that the harm would have to be the result of a crime, and that it would
have to be "serious.' 2 4 Consequently, harm that does occur which is not the
result of a crime, or harm from minor crimes would not have to be reported.
Thus, it is arguable that a business executive who reveals during a private meeting
with the mediator that he has committed tax fraud is under no jeopardy from that
mediator.
Similarly, the revelation of past crimes does not appear to be reportable, and
so we could imagine the case where an individual in a private session admits that
he has committed spousal abuse or even rape. Under the present codes, it would
appear that the perpetrator is immune from disclosure by the mediator.
The duty to report cases of child abuse is derived from a legal requirement
in force in all states.2 However, apart from the legal obligation, it is difficult
to see the moral distinction between the abuse of children and other dependent
parties, like the elderly, mentally incompetent, or even animals. All these groups
are equally capable of suffering at the hands of others without the ability to resist
or seek redress. There are even cases where the power imbalance is so significant
that a member of a group ordinarily supposed to be autonomous may feel
incapable of reporting abuse-for example, a beaten wife who accepts assault as
part of her marriage, or an intimidated homosexual man who is discriminated
against at work. If at least one of the reasons behind disclosure in child abuse
cases goes beyond mere compliance with the law and is instead concerned with
preventing unnecessary suffering, then we should consider widening the set of
abuse cases.
When mediators face difficult questions about the appropriate course of
action in a given situation, they look to the law for guidance. But, as I argue in
the next section, the law functions poorly as a basis for codes of ethics. I will
first raise questions about the general strategy of using the law as a moral

22.
a model
23.
24.
25.
abuse).

The Code of Conduct for the Colorado Council of Mediation Organizations (CCMO) has been
for many others.
CCMO Code, supra note 19, at 5 (confidentiality).
Id.
See infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text (regarding the legal requirements to report child
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yardstick and then indicate some special problems about applying the strategy to
the case of mediation.
A common way of underwriting a moral code is to look to the law. By this
way of thinking, the law reflects a codified morality. Hence, if we need to know
whether "insider trading" is immoral, then one test is to check whether it is illegal.
The writings about mediator confidentiality reflect this law based morality
assessment test. In addressing whether or not to break confidentiality, many
commentators have confined themselves to an examination and interpretation of
the law.26 Yet, if this move is made, we should be very open in acknowledging
that it represents a particular view of morality and one which often takes the law
at face value without questioning the values implicit in the policies behind the law.
Before examining the law on mediation confidentiality, I will first question
the assumption that we can derive normative standards through an examination of
the law.
VI. THE LAW Is NOT EQUIVALENT To MORALITY
Although there are many important points of agreement between morality and
the law, it would be wrong to assume that they are equivalent.27 Legal acts are
sometimes immoral, and moral acts are sometimes illegal. There are many
examples of shady dealings in business and public life where, strictly speaking,
nothing illegal has taken place, but nevertheless lies have been told, promises
broken, and individuals betrayed. 28 Moreover, some moral acts may be against
the law; this is perhaps best seen in retrospect. Segregation prior to the Civil
Rights Act treated blacks as second-class citizens, and civil disobedience-like
blacks sitting in forbidden seats on a bus-which targeted immoral racial
discrimination was against the law. We can now see that the racism involved was
clearly immoral, but perfectly legal. Thus, there is no simple equivalence between

26. See N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN, supra note 5, at 95-146; Folberg, Confidentialityand Privilege
in Divorce Mediation, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 319-39 (J. Folberg & A.
Milne eds. 1988); Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 2, at 37-45; Note, Protecting Confidentiality in
Mediation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 441, 441-59 (1984).
27. Thomas Aquinas showed that not all law has "moral oughtness" and according to Martin
Golding he:
listed the ways in which a purported law may be unjust and hence contrary to the natural
law: it may aim at the lawmaker's private good rather than the common good, it may aim
at the common good but its burdens may be unfairly imposed, or it may exceed the
constitutional or customary authority of the lawmaker to enact it into law.
M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 36 (1975). John Austin noted that "the existence of law is one
thing; its merit or demerit is another." Id. at 25 (quoting J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED (1832)).
28. I am tempted to call this the "Meese Defense" after the Reagan appointee who declared that
he had been cleared of any illegality, and therefore had done nothing wrong or punishable. See, e.g.,
Salholz, Meese'sLong Goodbye, NEWSWEEK, July 18,1988, at 32-34; Stengel, Ven4 Vid Vindicated?,
TIME, July 18, 1988, at 21.
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the law and morality. There may indeed be overlap; but although we may derive
law from morality, we cannot derive morality from the law alone.
Although I have argued that the law is not equivalent to morality, I am not
suggesting that the law never intersects with morality, or that there are no cases
where we may derive what is moral at least in part by examining the law. There
are clear cases where we can say that law and morality are in close harmony. For
example, murder and other kinds of unwarranted violence upon others breach both
law and morality. These might be described as mala in se, a legal term meaning
"wrongs in themselves."2 9 We can contrast such acts which are morally wrong
to malaprohibitaor acts which are made offenses and consequently prohibited by
positive laws."
Locke noted that in the seventeenth century the laws of man had developed
into a complex artifice, demanding specialists to interpret it, and what we ought
to do was no longer self-evident from an examination of the law:
For though it would be beside my present purpose to enter here into the
particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment, yet it is
certain there is such a law, and that, too, as intelligible and plain to a
rational creature and a studier of that law as the positive laws of
commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer, as much as reason is easier to
be understood than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men,
following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for truly so are
a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far
right as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be
regulated and interpreted.3'
Mediators who face difficult or novel questions about whether or not to
disclose client confidences are unlikely to find plain guidelines in the law.
Usually no conflict exists between the legal obligations of mediators and their
individual judgment; man-made law suggests that mediation ought to be a
confidential process, and major moral theories converge in thinking that there is
a prima facie obligation to keep confidences. Yet situations remain where it might
be appropriate for mediators to go against the letter of the law and break
confidentiality. 2
Employing a patchwork of legal precedent is unlikely to be sufficient grounds
to establish policy about what the individual mediator ought to do about
confidentiality. Nevertheless the law is worth examining, for in analyzing the law
we should be able to determine the policies and considerations that underlie the
present regulations.

29. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 861 (5th ed. 1979).
30. Id.

31. J. LocKE, THE

SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (T. Peardon ed. 1952).
32. Whistleblowing by a mediator is presently considered a prohibited activity under many codes.
See infra notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE LAW

A. Privilege and Immunity
Some commentators on mediation confidentiality (notably lawyers) have
suggested that mediation requires a level of protection comparable to the very
strong lawyer-client privilege.33 In order to understand this, we must look at the
legal distinction between privilege and immunity from testifying. A privilege is
a blanket protection from testimony, usually based on the special relationship
between parties.34 Thus, except for special exceptions, discourse between a
lawyer and client, doctor and patient, priest and penitent are held privileged and
undiscoverable.3 5 The key premise in this line of reasoning is that a confidential
relationship is considered necessary for the function of the office.
The lawyer-client privilege can be waived by the client.36 Thus, a client
may disclose whatever he or she wants to, leaving his or her lawyer no standing
to enforce confidentiality. In this sense the lawyer-client privilege is possibly
better thought of as a client privilege. Legislation is not always consistent in
mediation, but typically mediator-client privileges cannot be waived by the client
alone.37 For example the Colorado Dispute Resolution Act states:
Any party or the mediator or mediation organization in a mediation
service proceeding or a dispute resolution proceeding shall not
voluntarily disclose or through discovery or compulsory process be
required to disclose any information concerning any mediation
communication or any communication provided in confidence to the
mediator or a mediation organization unless . . . all parties to the
3
dispute resolutionproceeding and the mediator consent in writing.

33. See, e.g., Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 2 (strongly arguing for a statutory privilege for
mediators).
34. BLACK's LAw DICnONARY, supra note 29, at 1077; see also DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 323. Eric Green makes a useful distinction between privileges that
are dependent on the relationship between the holder of the privilege and the other communicant (e.g.
attorney-client, doctor-patient) and those which "throw a veil of secrecy around specific zones of
privacy in order to protect human dignity, individual autonomy, or family. Examples of this kind of
privilege include the husband-wife privilege and the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination."
Green, supra note 17, at 34-35. 1 will be dealing with the first type in this paper.
35. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (privilege for lawyers);
United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 526 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (privilege for psychiatrists).
36. See, e.g., N. RoGERS & C. McEWEN, supra note 5, at § 8.16.
37. Colorado Dispute Resolution Act, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-22-301- 313 (1991 & Supp. 1990)
(emphasis added).
38. Id. § 307(2) (emphasis added).
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The statutorily protected privilege is worrisome in that if both disputants felt that
they had a grievance, they would be unable to pursue it without the permission of
39
the mediator.

B. The Wigmore Test
Mediator confidentiality is controlled by statute and by case law. Statutes
exist in most states that have court-ordered mediation,' and are usually a
derivative from other statutes pertaining to the non-admissability of evidence from
settlement conferences.4
Absent such absolute statutes, the courts use a
balancing test to decide whether the benefits of maintaining confidentiality
outweigh the potential harms of disclosure.42
The balancing test that is usually applied is the "Wigmore test" where any
evidence that breaches confidentiality has to pass four criteria in order for'
confidentiality to be protected:
(1) Communications must originate in confidence that they will not be
disclosed to others.
(2) The preservation of secrecy must be essential to the success of the
relationship.
(3) The relationship is one which the public ought to foster and protect.
(4) The injury from disclosure must be greater than the benefit to be
gained by the public from non-disclosure.43
The test was applied when President Nixon invoked executive privilege to
withhold information in the Watergate Affair, and he was overruled by the
Supreme Court which believed that the public right to know was stronger than the

39. In fairness, there is a provision in the Colorado statute which allows disclosure in the case of
"willful or wanton misconduct," which is designed to allow malpractice suits to be filed against
mediators who seriously abuse their position. See id. § 307(2)(d). However, I believe that there is a
strong case for review and disclosure should the clients demand it. The present legislation allows
mediators to have veto rights over disclosure, and may serve to protect incompetent and ignorant
mediators. See generally id. § 307(2).
40. See generally N. ROGERS & C. MCEWEN, supra note 5, at 243 (Appendix A, containing a
comprehensive listing of statutes).
41. See id. at 145. Where the authors state that:
[a]bout half the statutory mediation privileges are qualified ones that balance competing
costs, permitting disclosure of mediation information where the need for that information
exceeds the value of protecting it. Others afford protection only to the mediator's
testimony, because such testimony has the greatest potential to disrupt mediation
communications and create a public perception that the mediator is an investigator or is
biased in favor of one side or the other. Still others show sensitivity to costs, through
exceptions, limited coverage, restrictions on who may raise the privilege, and limits on
the forums in which it applies.
ld; see also N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 15, at 61-105.
42. See, e.g., NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980).
43. J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (1961).
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maintenance of presidential secrecy."
The courts may compel evidence
whenever it is thought to be necessary, and even the confessional is not immune
from court scrutiny.45
The Wigmore test is significant in its demonstration that the issue of
confidentiality is largely grounded in a sort of "consequentialist calculus." The
mechanism of balancing benefits and harms has been used to justify mediator
attitudes to confidentiality, and many of the key assumptions implicit in the law
have been adopted wholesale. 46 However, on examination, I contend that the
assumptions themselves may not be sound enough to justify present practice.
C. Benefits and Harms
The fourth condition of Wigmore's test involves a balance of benefits and
harms.47 Therefore, it is worthwhile to assess what are perceived as the possible
benefits and harms associated with confidential mediation, since the apparent
societal policy is to use mediation to increase benefits and minimize harms.
The benefits of maintaining confidentiality are seen by the legal community
as (1) reducing the swollen court dockets, (2) possibly fostering expeditious
settlements, (3) lessening the costs of litigation by encouraging informal
settlements, and (4) strengthening relationships between potential litigants." It
is often claimed that mediation and its benefits would be ineffective and inefficient
without blanket immunity.49
The potential harms of immunity from testifying involve a lack of public
accountability in the form of fostering unfair agreements and harming
unrepresented parties.5" The doctrine of justice as a public affair has become

44. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974)).
45. See, e.g., A. BURSTEIN, LAWS CONCERNING REuGION IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (1966)
("Under the common law no privilege is extended to clergymen to withhold confidential
communications or confessions"); L. GUMPER, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MINISTRY (1981);
R. HAMMAR, PASTOR, CHURCH AND LAW (1983); Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionalityof the

Priest-PenitentPrivilege-theApplication of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. PrIT. L. REV. 27 (1967).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 119-22.
47. See, e.g., Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 54 (quoting 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 11 (1940)). The
Wigmore quote states that the public interest in revocation must be substantial if it is to cause us to:
concede that the evidence in question has all the probative value that can be required, and
yet exclude it because its admission would injure some other cause more than it would
help the cause of truth, and because the avoidance of that injury is considered of more
consequence than the possible harm to the cause of truth.
J. WIGMORE, supra, § 11.
48. See Restivo & Mangus, supra note 7, at 5-8. This benefit is based on the assumption that
stronger relationships will lessen future litigation.
49. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
50. See N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 15, at 61-87 (forcibly making this point).
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known as the right to "every man's evidence," where any person may have access
to the evidence that led to a judicial ruling.51
There are several areas where policy has protected mediated negotiations.
Included within these policies is Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 408, where
Congress found that the rule would "encourage settlements which would be
discouraged if such evidence were admissible." 52 It codifies the policy of
encouraging candid settlement discussions by specifically excluding evidence of
any such talks or conduct. FRE 408 is echoed by many state statutes.53 The
language in some of these statutes even grant mediators blanket immunities. For
example, the Massachusetts confidentiality statute reads in part:
All memoranda, and work product prepared by a mediator and a
mediator's case files, shall be confidential and not subject to disclosure
in any judicial or administrative proceeding involving any of the parties
to any mediation. And any communication made in the course of and
relating to the subject matter of any mediation and which is made in the
presence of such mediator by any participant, mediator or other person
shall be a confidential communication and not subject
to disclosure in
54
any such judicial or administrative proceeding.

51. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (opines that the public has a right to access
all presented evidence).
52. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
53. See 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1062 n.1 (Supp. 1987).
54. MAss. ANN.LAWS ch. 233, § 23C (Law Co-op. 1985). Similarly, the Colorado Statute reads:
Mediation proceedings shall be regarded as settlement negotiations, and no admission,
representation, or statement made in mediation not otherwise discoverable or obtainable
shall be admissible as evidence or subject to discovery. In addition, a mediator shall not
be subject to process requiring the disclosure of any matter discussed during mediation
proceedings.
COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 13-22-307.

Typical other examples include Oregon Statutes:
All communications, verbal or written, made in mediation proceedings shall be
confidential. A party or any other individual engaged in mediation proceedings shall not
be examined in any civil or criminal action as to such communications and such
communications shall not be used in any civil or criminal action without the consent of
the parties to the mediation. Exceptions to the testimonial privilege otherwise applicable
under ORS 40.225 to 40.295 [lawyer-client, physician-patient, and other statutory
privileges] do not apply to communications made confidential under this subsection.
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.785(2) (1991).
The Florida Statute: "All verbal or written communication in mediation or conciliation
proceedings shall be confidential and inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent legal proceedings,
unless both parties agree otherwise." FLA. STAT. § 61.21(3) (1982).
The New York Statute:
All memoranda, work products, or case files of a mediator are confidential and not subject
to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding. Any communication relating
to the subject matter of the resolution made during the resolution process by any
participant, mediator, or any communication relating to the subject matter of the resolution
made during the resolution process by any participant, mediator or any other person
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Labor cases prove to be a regular testing ground for Federal Rule of
Evidence 408, where congressional intent and court dicta hold that the potential
stability and industrial harmony that labor settlements promise are sufficient to
override considerations of public accountability." In re Tomlinson of High
Point, Inc." and NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc.,s7 are the key cases in labor
mediation. In Tomlinson the court defended mediator immunity in policy terms:
The inevitable result [of compelling mediator testimony] would be that
the usefulness of the Conciliation Service in the settlement of future
disputes would be seriously impaired, if not destroyed. The resultant
injury to the public interest would clearly outweigh the benefit to be
derived from making their testimony available in particular cases.5"
A later case, NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso,Inc., employs the same sort of reasoning.
The Macaluso court asserted:
Parties participating in mediation efforts must have the assurance and
confidence that information disclosed to commissioners and other
employees of the service will not subsequently be divulged, voluntarily
or because of compulsion .... The complete exclusion of mediator
testimony is necessary to the preservation of an effective system of
labor mediation, and . . . labor mediation is essential to continued
industrial stability, a public interest sufficiently great to outweigh the
interest in obtaining every person's evidence.59
Several other cases reinforce both the protection granted to settlement
conferences and the justification based on grounds of policy. For example, in
Bottarro v. Hatton Associates,60 several parties were attempting to settle, and
only one came to an agreement. 6' The court denied a request from the others to
discover details about the successful negotiation.62 In defense, the Bottarro court
said:

present at the dispute resolution shall be a confidential communication.
N.Y. IUD. LAW § 849(b)(6) (Consol. 1981).
55. See, e.g., Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 56. The reasoning in Macaluso has successfully been used
as a defense against testifying by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. See City of Port
Arthur v. United States, 517 F.Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1981), aft'd, 459 U.S. 159 (1982).
56. 74 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 681 (1947).
57. 618 F.2d 51.
58. Tomlinson, 74 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 688.
59. Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 56.
60. 96 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
61. Id. at 159.
62. Id. at 158.
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Given the strong public policy of favoring settlements and the
congressional intent to further that policy by insulating the bargaining
table from unnecessary intrusions, we think the better rule is to require
some particularized showing of a likelihood that admissible evidence
will be generated by the dissemination of the terms of a settlement
agreement. 3
Labor mediation is not only protected from judicial discovery but is also
immune from revelation under the Freedom of Information Act. 64 The House
in
Report on the Act reads that exemptions would include "disclosures 6 made
5
procedures such as the mediation of labor-management controversies."
The protection of settlement negotiations extends beyond labor disputes.
There are protected negotiations for the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission," and settlement conferences sponsored by the Housing and Urban
Development Administration. 7 Mediator immunity has also been upheld in
environmental mediation. In Adler v. Adams,' the court noted that requiring
disclosure from mediators who had resolved a dispute would "severely inhibit the
proper performance of his or her duties, and thereby undercut the effectiveness of
the mediation process .. .There is a substantial public interest in fostering
effective mediation techniques in settlement of disputes."69 Finally, the Dispute

63. Id. at 160; see also Pipefitters, Local 208 v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 90 Lab. Cas.
(CCH)
12,647, 27,072 (D. Colo. 1980) ("Effective mediation hinges upon whether labor and
management negotiators feel free to advance tentative proposals and pursue possible solutions that later
may prove unsatisfactory to one side or the other. Such uninhibited interaction may be impaired absent
the assurance that mediation proceedings will remain confidential").
64. Restivo & Mangus, supra note 7, at 6. Restivo and Mangus also note that there is an
exemption for labor from the Freedom of Information Act. Id. Congressional records specifically
include "disclosures made in procedures such as the mediation of labor-management controversies."
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS
2418, 2427. Moreover, information disclosed to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and
the National Mediation Board shall not be divulged: "Labor and management or other interested
parties participating in mediation efforts must have the assurance and confidence that information
disclosed to commissioners and other employees of the Service will not subsequently be divulged,
voluntarily or because of compulsion, unless authorized by the Director of the Service." 29 C.F.R. §
1401.2(a) (1991).
65. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 64, at 2427.
66. See Restivo & Mangus, supra note 7, at 6. "[Niothing said or done during and as part of such
informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission... or used as evidence in a subsequent
proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1981).
This is also supported by case law. For example, in Branch v PhillipsPetroleum Co., the court barred
the defendant's discovery of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) materials relating
to charges filed against former employers. 638 F.2d 873, 881 (5th Cir. 1981). The court noted that
"disclosure of conciliation materials . . . would discourage negotiated settlement and frustrate the
intention of Congress." Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1988); see also Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1974).
68. Adler v Adams, No. 675-73(2), slip op. (E.D. Wash. May 3, 1979).
69. Id. at 3.
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Resolution Act of 19800 called for procedures which would "ensure reasonable
privacy protection for individuals involved in the dispute resolution process."7
The justifications for Federal Rule of Evidence 408 have also been used in
cases where confidentiality has been contracted. In Simrin v. Simrin72 a
divorcing couple contracted to a confidentiality agreement when they went into
marital counseling." Later, in divorce proceedings, the wife argued that the
suppression of evidence from the mediated conference was unwarranted and
contrary to public policy. 74 Drawing on an analogy with Federal Rule of
Evidence 408, the Simrin court responded that:
For the unwary spouse who speaks freely, repudiation [of the
confidentiality agreement] would prove a trap; for the wily, a vehicle
[S]tatements that are made
for making self-serving declarations ....
in offer of compromise and to avoid or settle litigation . . .are not

admissible in evidence.75
D. Summary of the Legal Basis for Mediation
Confidentiality
At first glance, it appears that there is a strong legal presumption in favor of
maintaining confidentiality in mediation. The professional relationship of mediator
to client is sometimes held to be similar to that of the lawyer to his or her client
with the attendant presumption of a privilege.76 It also appears that the courts
often presume that in the benefit/harm calculus, maximum benefit will come about
by maintaining confidentiality in mediation.77

70. Dispute Resolution Act of 1980, Pub. L. No 96-190, 94 Stat. 17 (1980) (this Act depended
on funding that was not made available and was consequently never enacted).
71. SPECIAL COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PUBLIC SERVICES Div. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:

MEDIATION AND THE LAW: WILL REASON PREVAIL? 85 (eds.

Ray, Kestner, Freedman & Clare Aug. 9, 1983) (panel discussion series, topic 3-1983) (quoting Dispute
Resolution Act of 1980, § 4F).
72. 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). A rabbi undertook
marriage counseling "only after an express agreement that their communications to him would be
confidential and that neither would call him as a witness in the event of a divorce action" Id. at 94,
43 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
73. Id. at 92, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
74. Id. at 95, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
75. Id. For a further discussion of Simrin see J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 271 (1984); N. ROGERS &
R. SALEM, supra note 15, at 98.
76. See, e.g., J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 75, at 267-70.

77. See, e.g., Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 54-55.
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VIII. ASSESSING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR MEDIATION
CONFIDENTIALITY

Mediators often presume that there is a blanket of judicial immunity that
protects them against having to testify about confidential proceedings. 78 The key
assumptions for the present set of rulings (and the legal benefit/harm test) are:
Mediation is ineffective unless it is confidential.
Mediation makes the court system more efficient.
Labor mediation promotes a policy of industrial harmony.
Generalizations can be made from one type of mediation to
another (e.g. labor to divorce).
(E) In a benefit/harm calculus, disclosure in an particular case could
damage the overall mediation process and hence render it
ineffective. Since this would be a very unwelcome result, attempts
to preserve the process must take precedence over the desire to
have access to information in any individual case.
(F) Mediator testimony would compromise their image as impartials.
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

Taking these individually, we can see that the legal and moral underpinnings for
mediators' assurances of confidentiality are shaky, at best. The basis for a
mediator's decision ought to rest upon legal and moral arguments. The legal
assumptions are often based on notions of efficiency;79 they are not often made
explicit80 and they are vague in the scope of their application.
A. Mediation is Ineffective Unless it is
Confidential
There is little evidence to suggest that mediation would be ineffective if it
were not confidential. It is argued that people would be reluctant to be candid
unless there were some assurance that revealed information would not be
disclosed.81 However, there are counter-arguments which suggest that a degree

78. See N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 15, at 62.
79. 1 do not want to deny that there is merit in expedience; clearly there is benefit in efficiency
for any system of justice. My concern is that efficiency should be balanced against other elements in
a just legal system (or a just system), and not regarded as self-evidently self-justifying.
80. Legal dicta may not be the best place to find the most sophisticated arguments in support of
a position; they are more likely to be found in law review articles and professional journals. However,
much of the literature takes the key legal dicta (as in Tomlinson or Simrin) uncritically, and, moreover,
there is at present relatively little review work on mediation confidentiality - hence the dicta represent
important and seminal thinking on the subject.
81. Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 2, at 37-45.
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of public accountability fosters good-faith bargaining. 2 Some mediation
programs report high settlement rates despite the fact that they do not assure
confidentiality. 3
It is entirely possible that mediation could function well with a limited basis
of confidentiality, and expressed fears that breaching the seal of the mediation
would bring the whole process into question are probably overstated. "Open"
mediation may alter the nature of the mediation process somewhat, since
participants might guard what they say. Still, the settlement rate of a more open
process shows it to be as successful as mediation that gives traditional assurances
Thus one inference that might be drawn is that a
about confidentiality.8
presumption of confidentiality should not be thought of as a decisive factor in the
success of mediation, since mediation in some form can operate effectively
without it.
B. Mediation Makes the Court System More Efficient
Mediation may well make the courts more efficient. However, the degree of
confidentiality in mediation is dependent on the efficacy of the court system and
part of the justification for mediation confidentiality is a second-order appeal to
the efficiency of the formal legal system. Hence, confidentiality is justified not
in its own terms but as an adjunct to the courts. If an administration made
clearing court dockets through formal procedures a high priority, or if there were
innovations like awarding costs to the winning side (with the consequence of
chilling much potential litigation), we might see the backlog of cases vanish. But
once formal court systems become more efficient, there would be less reason for
mediation to remain confidential.
C. Labor Mediation Promotes a Policy of Industrial
Harmony
It is possible that the courts might alter the basic policy that puts a premium
on industrial peace and correlatively promotes mediation. Labor courts have often

82. See, e.g., Note, supra note 26, at 452-54. That author discusses Federal Rule of Evidence 408
and comments that the broad protection that it confers does not protect "participants in negotiation who
abuse the negotiation process ... such as a duty to bargain in good faith; presumably this limitation
would apply to mediation as well." Id. at 449.
83. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ABA DIsPUTE RESOLUTION DIRECTORY 145-50 (L. Ray, B. Davis,
M. Shuffleton & A. Clare, eds. 1983). This work refers to three Ohio programs - the Columbus Night
ProsecutorProgram, the Cleveland ProsecutorMediation Program and the CincinnatiNight Private
ComplaintProgram - which settle over 75% of mediated cases. N. ROGERS & R.SALEM, supra note
15, at 68 (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASs'N, supra, at 145, 146 & 150); see also Roehl & Cook,
Mediation in Interpersonal Dispute: Effectiveness and Limitations, in K. KRESEL & D. PRUITr,
MEDIATION RESEARCH 34-36 (1989).
84. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 83, at 145-50.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

17

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1992, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
used the analogy of constant confrontation to describe the industrial situation, for
example Justice Holmes dissenting in Vegelahn v. Guntners5 noted that:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between
the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that
of society, disguised under
the name of capital, to get his services for
6
the least possible return.8
Traditionally the policy has been to promote harmony in this struggle. a7
However, it is feasible that future administrations might consider that imposed
harmony is less desirable than a winner emerging from fair conflict in the free
market." At one time, the government might have intervened to encourage a
settlement, however, the Reagan administration considered the optimal result for
the free market would come from open economic contests between labor and
capital.89
It is quite possible, then, that court support for mediation
confidentiality could quickly evaporate depending on the prevailing economic
policy.

85. 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 108, 44 N.E. at 1081.
87. See, e.g., Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 54 (discussing the congressional intent behind the creation
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service). "It is the policy of the United States that - (a)
sound and stable industrial peace . . . can most satisfactorily be secured by the settlement of issues
between employers and employees through the process of conference and collective bargaining." Id.
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 171(a)(b)).
88. See, e.g., T. EDSALL, THE REAGAN LEGACY (1988). Edsall claims:
The undermining of labor was then intensified by deregulation, and by decisions of
regulatory boards and agencies as diverse as the Federal Maritime Commission and the
National Labor Relations Board, although the NLRB has played perhaps the key role.
During the Reagan administration the NLRB has issued rulings that allow employers to
hire temporary nonunion workers during lockouts, that facilitate the relocation of
unionized plants to nonunion facilities while the union contract remains in effect... that
increase the latitude of employers to refuse to take back workers accused of misconduct
during strikes. The effect of these rulings has been to weaken severely the collectivebargaining leverage of unions.
Id. at 33-34.
89. See, e.g., Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway LaborAct in the
Era of Deregulation,42 STAN. L. REv. 1485 (1990). The author describes some of the tactics used
by employers to circumvent the Railway Labor Act. Id. at 1494-98. Even provisions for employee
protection were neglected, since in the era of deregulation this itself became an item on the table
collective bargaining rather than an assumed right. Id. at 1491-92. 1believe that the historical record
shows that the established policy promoting industrial harmony fostered by government intervention
has been eroded in the Reagan/Bush administrations.
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D. GeneralizationsCan be Made From One Type of
Mediation to Another
There is no compelling reason to believe that all kinds of mediation are
similar, or that the same rules need apply universally. Although similar mediation
principles may apply to say, small claims cases and environmental cases, there are
many practical differences. Small claims deal with relatively small amounts of
money, 9° rarely involve a relationship that must necessarily continue,9 ' and are
usually limited to two individuals.92 In environmental mediation there may be
many parties represented and some affected parties may not be at the table.93
Environmental issues may also be complex. The consequences that result from
a poor environmental settlement are more likely to be lasting and affect a greater
population." Moreover, the public at large may have an interest in the result of
a precedent-setting environmental settlement in a way that they would not have in
a small claims case.
Thus, there are wide differences in mediation and, unfortunately, the same
process may be used to treat cases which differ in the number of disputants, the
scope of the dispute and the weight of the consequences. However, it is entirely
possible that there is greater public interest at stake in one sort rather than another,
and hence the rule on confidentiality which may be appropriate for one case may
not be appropriate for another. Mediation is developing as a profession and along
with this wide application of ADR it might be the case that broad and inclusive
codes are no longer suitable.

E. In a Benefit/Harm Calculus, Disclosure in any
ParticularCase Could Damage the Overall Mediation
Process and Hence Render it Ineffective
Since this would be a very unwelcome result, attempts to preserve the
process must take precedence over the desire to have access to information in any
individual case. At least one court has determined that the benefit/harm calculus
results in a presumption of access rather than confidentiality in settlement

90. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-6-403 (Supp. 1991) (the Colorado Small Claims Division
handles cases where the amount at issue is less than $3500).
91. Typical small claims cases would be debt, damage, tort or injury, between such parties as a
contractor and client, vendor and client, individuals such as neighbors or aggrieved acquaintances, or
a member of an organization in conflict with the organization. Occasionally family members may file
suit with one another, and there, of course, the relationship will continue; however, most of the parties
have no necessary reason to continue the relationship.
92. See generally CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-6-403 & 407 (Supp. 1991).
93. Some parties, for example future residents, could not possibly be present.
94. Contrast small claims and environmental settlements: In small claims damages are awarded,
and the parties are free to go their separate ways. In an environmental case, like the placement of a
new freeway or dam, the effects will be more widespread and permanent; even if the residents move,
the aesthetics of the area will inevitably be changed.
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conferences.9" In Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v.
Hotel Rittenhouse Associates,96 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that the common law right of access to judicial records overcame the policy of
encouraging settlements.97 In some cases, we can expect that the presumption
of promoting mediation by supporting mediation confidentiality will be overturned
in circumstances where there is thought to be substantial public interest. Thus,
mediators can no longer assume that there is an automatic general judicial
protection for their enterprise. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 gives
the court discretion to interpret privileges in "the light of reason and
'
experience."98
Although mediators may expect a degree of protection under the
law, they should not assume that any benefit/harm calculation will necessarily
always favor the confidentiality of the mediation process over the rights to public

access.
F. Mediator Testimony Would Compromise Their Image
as Impartials
Courts preserve confidentiality as a guarantee of impartiality, since any
testimony by a neutral may be interpreted as favoring one side or another."
Thus, we find a passage in Tomlinson which states:
However useful the testimony of a conciliator might be in any given
case the conciliators must maintain a reputation for impartiality, and the
parties to conciliation conferences must feel free to talk without any
fear that the conciliator may subsequently make disclosures as a witness
in some other proceeding, to the possible disadvantage of a party to the
conference. If conciliators were permitted or required to testify about

95. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 339-44
(3d Cir. 1986).
96. 800 F.2d 339. Bank ofAmerica National Trust and Savings Association v. Hotel Rittenhouse
Associates has been cited often, for example in the case of Littlejohn v BIC Corp. where Rittenhouse
is cited with the comment:
As with other branches of government, the bright light cast upon the judicial process by
public observation diminishes possibilities for injustice, incompetence, perjury and fraud.
Furthermore the very openness of the process should provide the public with a more
complete understanding of the judicial system and a better perception of its fairness.
Littlejohn, 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988). Significantly, one court cited Rittenhouse with the
warning "[c]ounsel in future cases would be well advised to scrutinize carefully those documents that
are filed with the court ....The parties also may choose to file a voluntary stipulation of dismissal,
instead of the settlement agreement, if they seek to prevent public access to their settlement
agreement." H.S. Gere & Sons, Inc. v. Frey, 509 N.E.2d 271, 275 n.16, 400 Mass. 326, 332 n.16
(1987); see also Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252-54 (4th Cir. 1988).
97. Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 346; see also Deiters,A Setback for the Public Policy of Encouraging
Settlements, 1988 J.Disp'. RESOL. 219, 219-26 (1988) (discussing the Rittenhouse case).
98. FED. R. EVID. 501.
99. Tomlinson, 74 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 688.
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their activities, or if the production of notes or reports of their activities
could be required, not even the strictest adherence to purely factual
matters would prevent the evidence from favoring or seeming to favor
one side or the other. 1°°
Again, in Macaluso the court reasoned that forcing the mediator to testify would
impair his or her future effectiveness by destroying "the appearance of
impartiality."10 ' The court reasoned:
The company argued that revocation of [the mediator's] subpoena was
improper because communications made to him during the course of the
bargaining sessions were necessarily made in the presence of the
opposing party and were not, therefore, confidential. Such a contention
which is to
misapprehends the purpose of excluding mediator testimony
02
avoid a breach of impartiality, not confidentiality.1
Here again, we need to recognize that confidentiality is considered good
because it aids the functioning of the court, not because it is good-in-itself.0 3
The argument is that if a mediator is no longer perceived as impartial then people
will cease using mediation and settlement conferences would be less successful.
The argument can be attacked on two grounds: (1) we might not accept the
linkage between impartiality and confidentiality that the courts make, and (2) it
might be asserted that confidentiality is intrinsically good, and thus that its value
cannot be measured by its contribution to legal efficiency.
It is useful to draw a distinction between two senses of impartiality: One is
the very strong notion of having a completely disinterested viewpoint;'0 4 the
other is in favoring neither side in a dispute.'03 No mediator is impartial in the
stronger sense-it is impossible. It is inevitable that an individual will retain
memories and biases associated with sex, race, upbringing, socio-economic group,
however hard he or she tries to avoid them. The court accepts that mediators will
not be impartial in this way.

100. Id.
101. See Macaluso, 618 F.2d. at 55.
102. Id. at 55-56.
103. Id. Macaluso has been taken to apply to mediation in general and not just to courtsupervised mediation. ADR in general is supported by the courts in part because of the relief of
pressure on the docket that it provides. See id. Thus even private mediation is supported because it
is thought that but for mediation those disputes might look for legal resolution. See generally id.
104. This is the sort of impartiality demanded, for example, by John Rawls' "veil of ignorance"
put forward in his A Theory of Justice. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). There he demands
that in order for us to discover first principles of justice we should systematically put aside knowledge
of our place in society, individual talents and inclinations, social status, political ideology and any other
accidental features of our lives. Id. at 136-42.
105. This weaker version of impartiality is found in lexical definitions, such as "unbiased, fair,
equitable, not favoring one party or side more than another." OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY, supra
note 9, at 1382 (emphasis added).
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The second sense of impartial disinterest is that of treating all sides alike,
without favoritism. It is possible to treat clients impartially while holding personal
opinions which would favor one side, but which are "shelved" or "bracketed"
during the process. Court opinion implies that public acknowledgment that a
mediator operates with the second type of impartiality will somehow compromise
the perception of his or her impartiality during the process. Thus, the claim is
that if a mediator testifies about his or her perceptions within the mediation, at
least one of the principals will perceive the testimony as demonstrating that the
mediator was biased during the negotiations'0 6. But such a claim fails to
recognize that the mediator may have sufficient professional
distance to remove
10 7
him or herself to an impartial position when at work.
There are two dubious lines of reasoning behind the assumption that
mediator testimony will inevitably compromise the perception of impartiality. The
first is that a person cannot act impartially while simultaneously holding a private
opinion." This seems incorrect in that any counseling profession requires that
the therapist not offer personal opinion or judgment about the acts of the patient,
although the therapist obviously has a personal point of view.'09 Secondly, it
is assumed that mediators could not testify about their own perceptions without
losing credibility as impartials." ° But this assumption could be defeated by
asking a standard initial question during testimony about whether the parties
thought that the mediator was, in fact, impartial during the negotiations.
Subsequently, as long as the mediator's testimony is presented as either about facts
(what happened in a given session) or about personal opinion ("in your opinion,
was one side stonewalling?") then it is unlikely that the perception of mediator
impartiality will be destroyed. Thus a mediator can have privileged opinions, and
yet act impartially.
The reasoning in Macaluso relies on the premise that a mediator who is
perceived as being partial will be ineffective."' If mediation is effective as long

106. See, e.g., Tomlinson, 74 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 688.
107. There is a genuine concern that whatever the mediator's real position, there may be a public
perception of bias which would be hard to overcome. Perhaps the issue requires the test of experience.
108. The issue is whether an "impartial mediator" is defined as one who has no opinion, or one
who may have one but does not express it. Admittedly, a mediator may not have developed an opinion
about the best solution to an issue at hand, or may have no opinion about the behavior of a party
during the negotiations, and presumably that would be an acceptable response to questions in court.
Nevertheless a mediator might make inferences based on experience and training about a mediation
sessionfor example, whether or not it was productive, whether or not the participants were genuinely
working toward settlement, or whether the negotiations were in good faith. It would appear that
whatever definition of "impartial mediator" is employed, it is really the public expression of these
inferences that worries the courts.
109. More trivially, a tennis umpire might not like the explosive temper of one of the players, and
yet not let this color his or her calls during the match.
110. See, e.g., Tomlinson, 74 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 681. That court states "not even the strictest
adherence to purely factual matters would prevent the evidence from favoring or seeming to favor one
side or the other." Id. at 685.
111. See Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 56 (the court's holding).
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as the intervenor is acceptable rather than impartial in some ideal sense, then it
is possible that a partial mediator can nevertheless be effective.
It might be argued that demonstrating mediator bias through the fact of
testifying for one side rather than the other will discourage potential clients. They
feel the process will be steered in a particular way, or alternatively because they
feel that they need to be guarded in front of a mediator, since their acts during
mediation may be subject to discovery. Clients might also feel at risk if their acts
are misinterpreted by the mediator and lead to actual harm when the mediator's
opinion is made public.
The first two objections carry little weight. If a mediator has opinions that
steer the process, this will occur as much in closed mediation as it would in open
mediation. The claim about modified behavior has an equal and opposite counter
in that an open process might well encourage participants to be more productive
and accountable.
A stronger objection is that a mediator may cast a disputant's actions in such
a way that may have harmful consequences. Stonewalling is an example of this
objection. If an individual was not stonewalling, but in fact was negotiating in
good faith, (although he had run out of ideas), mediator testimony to the effect
that he was negotiating in bad faith will be unfairly damaging. 12 To safeguard
against such unfair treatment, mediators and the parties could look to other
situations where attorneys call on expert opinion in testimony. Expert opinions
are notoriously diverse, and so precautions might include having more than one
are
mutually acceptable mediator in any session,1 3 or ensuring that 1 there
14
complete records, including audio or video taping of the proceedings.
Since the courts view the impartiality requirement as paramount, and
confidentiality secondary, a procedure that ensures impartiality might cause the
confidentiality requirement to fall by the wayside or to be taken as far less
stringent. Even if confidentiality is secondary, it requires explicit recognition that
it is still, nevertheless, important or necessary. The language in Macaluso strongly
suggests that confidentiality is legally necessary only in so far as it supports
Although Macaluso governs attitudes to mediation
impartiality."'
confidentiality, especially in labor and court-ordered mediation, there are other

112. This problem is not unique to mediation; it occurs in any "caring profession" where expert
testimony is called upon. A typical example would be a social worker required to testify about the
likelihood of abuse having taken place.
113. I am thinking of analogous governmental processes where one party nominates and the other
may veto a person for a given position which guarantee that an individual is acceptable to both sides.
A model would be the Advice and Consent powers of the Senate under the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. It, § 2.
114. Some commentators suggest that neutrals keep the minimum of records and that casenotes
be destroyed. See, e.g., Rowe, Simon & Bensinger, Ombudsman Dilemmas: Confidentiality,
Neutrality, Testifying, Recordkeeping, in DISPuTE RESOLUTION AND DEMocRAcY IN THE 1990's 292
(C. Cutrona, D. McCabe & W. Wilkins eds. 1990). If confidentiality is the central issue, this would
be appropriate. On the other hand, if demonstrable impartiality is the goal, it seems to me that the
more records and public accountability, the better.
115. See Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 56.
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cases which give other reasons to support confidentiality,1n and so it is possible
7
Assuming
that the Macaluso doctrine will be less influential in the future."
that cases of confidentiality breach will be unusual and will be accompanied by
an explanation by the mediator for his or her actions, I believe the threat to
impartiality to be less damaging than often claimed. The key premise in legal
reasoning for maintaining confidentiality has been to protect the reputation of
impartiality."1 This premise is not as strong as it initially appears, and it alone
cannot adequately justify confidentiality in all cases.

G. Summary of the Legal Assumptions Favoring
Confidentiality
The law is directed at the permissibility of outsiders to intrude into the
mediation process. Statutes often give unconditional protection to mediators from
9
outside interference, and case law usually gives conditional protection." The
mediator might reasonably extrapolate from these protections that he or she should
maintain absolute confidentiality. However, when we look at the assumptions on
which the claims for absolute confidentiality are based, we find that they are not
as comprehensive or watertight as they may initially appear.
We should also note that the justifications given for mediation confidentiality
are often expedient-essentially designed to take pressure off the overburdened
court system.120 We can imagine that the courts could be relieved of their load
by an allocation of resources to support more judges, overtime in the courts, or
using retired judges. This particular justification for confidentiality would then be
weakened or even disappear.
Nevertheless, the institution of non-adjudicated settlement is broadly
supported, and the policies that are reflected in the law serve to promote
mediation.' 2 ' Mediators can be confident that their enterprise is in accord with
general policy and is considered beneficial on a societal level. All types of
settlement may not be seen as equally desirable, though, and there could be much
more emphasis and support for one kind of mediation rather than another. For

116. See, e.g., Adler v. Adams, No. 675-73(2), slip op. at 2. That court rejected a subpoena served
on a mediator. Id. It used a balancing test, and put the onus of proving that non-disclosure would
cause serious injury onto the party seeking discovery. Id. at 2-3. Significantly the central reliance on
mediator impartiality will become only one argument that may be presented to defend mediation
confidentiality.
117. Id. at 2.
118. See Macaluso, 618 F. 2d at 55-56; also supra note 108.
119. See N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN, supra note 5, at 145.
120. In encouraging Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Congress has described the courts as
"largely unavailable, inaccessible, ineffective, expensive or unfair." Dispute Resolution Act of 1980,
§ 2(a), 94 Stat. at 17. ADR has appeared to many to be a credible method of providing speedy and
flexible justice to people whose disputes are not uniquely suited for the court system. See, e.g.,
Cratsley, Community Courts: Offering Alternative Dispute Resolution within the JudicialSystem, 3
VT. L. REV. 1 (1978).
121. See N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN, supra note 5, at 145.
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example, administrations might think that labor mediation should be confidential
but environmental mediation deals in significantly different issues and should
therefore be subject to public scrutiny. This sort of distinction is implicit in the
fact that immunity from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act has been
limited to labor mediation alone. 22 Protections on the basis of public policy as
interpreted by the courts are therefore not broad and inclusive but instead are
altogether contingent. Thus, there may be differences within mediation practice
on a policy level.
The presumption of confidentiality in mediation is often based on a reading
of the law. However, when we look at the implicit legal assumptions they do not
support a clear-cut rule for mediators to always keep their client's confidences.
Acts by mediators may not always be consistent over time and between different
types of mediation. Therefore, the law is unlikely to be an adequate guide for
mediator behavior. I will now turn from assumptions which function to preserve
confidentiality to cases where it is assumed that there is a duty to disclose.
IX. THE DUTY TO BREAK CONFIDENTIALITY
Usually, the only clear reference to a mediator's duty to actively break
confidentiality is the duty to warn of imminent harm and the duty to report child
abuse.' 23
A. The Duty to Warn
The landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California24
serves as precedent in cases where confidentiality is in conflict with a duty to
warn third parties. Tarasoff concerned a patient, Prosenjit Poddar, who told his
therapist during psychotherapy that he would kill an unnamed, but clearly
identifiable, young woman.' 25 The therapist, who worked for the University of
California, believed the threats were real and informed the campus police,
requesting their assistance in confining Poddar. 26 The police took Poddar into
custody, but released him shortly afterwards since they considered him
rational. 27 Tatania Tarasoff, the potential victim, was not warned. 28 Poddar
ended therapy, and killed Tarasoff roughly two months after making his initial

122. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 64, at 2417-18. The language reads that the exemption for
certain commercial and financial information includes "negotiating positions or requirements in the case
of labor-management mediation." Id.
123. See, e.g., SPIDR ETHICAL STANDARDS, supra note 20; Arizona Code of Ethics, supra note
19; CCMO Code, supra note 19.
124. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
125. Id. at 432, 551 P. 2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr at 21.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

25

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1992, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
declaration. 129 Tarasoff's family sued the university, which negotiated an out-ofcourt settlement on the basis that they had failed to give adequate warning to
either the victim or her family.13 °
The 1976 Tarasoff ruling by the California Supreme Court, requires
psychotherapists to disclose information needed to protect the public from violent
Tarasoff is 132a
patients, even when doing so breaches confidentiality."'
significant precedent in that it places upon the professional the "duty to warn."
It should be noted that Tarasoffis more than a passive removal of immunity from
without prompting. The "duty to
testimony; it imposes an active duty to disclose
33
warn" has been upheld in similar cases.
Currently, the duty to warn has not been specifically imposed on mediators,
although the analogy seems to be strong enough to' support a parallel duty to that
of therapists and counselors. Like therapists, mediators are in a position where
they are likely to become aware of the intentions of a client because of their
special relationship to the parties. Thus, a potentially violent husband in a divorce
proceeding may only disclose his intentions to hurt his wife's lover because he is
in a setting which encourages the sharing of his feelings about the divorce by
someone trained in perceptive listening.
The Tarasoff precedent brings with it several problems. For example,
Tarasoff is based on a threat and it is left to the professional to gauge the
seriousness of that threat. It is not clear whom the mediator would contact: the
victim directly, the police, or some superior in the mediation center. Moreover,
to decide what exactly constitutes "serious psychological or
the mediator is left
1 34
physical harm."
Asking whether it is likely that a crime will be committed unless mediation
confidentiality is broken simplifies this question. However, such a simple rule
fails in that there could be reportable cases which are not crimes, and cases which
are crimes but may not warrant disclosure. The Tarasoff case itself deals only a
very serious sort of crime-premeditated murder-and therefore its application

129. Id.
130. Id. The court concludes "the public policy favoring protection of the confidential character
of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to
avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins." Id. at 446, 551
P. 2d at 351, 131 Cal Rptr. at 14. A discussion of the case is found in Helms, Mediators' Duties,
Informed Consen4 and the Hatfields Versus the McCoys, MEDIATION Q., Fall 1988, at 65.
131. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 444-45, 551 P.2d at 349, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
132. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23. In Tarasoff the court states: "Although
plaintiffs' pleadings assert no special relation between Tatania and defendant therapists, they establish
as between Poddar and defendant therapists the special relation that arises between a patient and his
doctor or psychotherapist. Such a relationship may support affirmative duties for the benefit of third
persons." Id. at 436, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
133. See, e.g., Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983); McIntosh v. Milano, 168
N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
134. CCMO Code, supra note 19, at 5. I presume that most mediators will be more familiar with
their codes of conduct than case law.
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may be very narrow.1 35 It does not give guidance on other sorts of serious
crime, nor does it offer help on acts which may be either illegal but morally
justifiable, like the environmental protest, or cases which are legal but immoral,
like a cartel agreement.
An example of a threatened crime where it is unclear whether there might be
"serious physical harm" sufficient to warrant disclosure is a case where an
environmental group suggests during a private caucus with the mediator that one
planned "event" will to splash blood over a furrier's stock. The group is seeking
publicity and will acknowledge the act and offer to pay for any damage. The
damage would be to property which is susceptible to restitution. 136 In the
absence of strict rules, the mediator is again forced to rely on his or her personal
judgment.
Nevertheless, it appears incumbent on the mediator to know the appropriate
area of law 3 7 and judge the severity of any admission. However mere
knowledge in advance of a crime seems insufficient to warrant a presumed duty
to warn.

B. Child Abuse
Child abuse is assumed by many mediators to be the sole justified exception
to mediation confidentiality, and they tell their clients at the outset that they will
halt the process and report any revealed incidents. 13 The law generally imposes
a duty to report by a "caring professional . . .having cause to believe that a
child's physical or mental health or welfare has been or may be adversely affected
by abuse or neglect." 139 The set of professionals who must report abuse includes
physicians, nurses, social workers, teachers, psychologists, chiropractors, public

135. The language in Tarasoff is vague; although it talks of conditions warranting disclosure as
those which involve "serious danger to others," 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
25, or "public peril," 17 Cal.3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27, the examples that are
cited and the language that the court uses imply that the danger is life-threatening. For instance, the
court cites two cases, the first where a doctor must warn if the patient has a medical condition which
would make activities like driving a car dangerous to others, and the second, where the Veteran's
Administration set a patient up with a job on a farm without warning the farmer that he was potentially
dangerous. Id. at 437, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (citing Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 272 F. Supp 409 (D.N.D. 1967); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 65 Wash. 2d 461,
398 P.2d 14 (1965)). The Veteran's Administration was found negligent when the patient later killed
the farmer's wife. Merchant's Nat'l, 272 F. Supp. at 421. The Tarasoff court discusses "warning
against the peril to the victim's life," "the lives of possible victims," and "the danger that would result
from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that hispatient was lethal." 17 Cal.3d at 439 & 442, 551
P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27 (emphasis added).. The Tarasoff precedent appears to deal
mainly with mortal danger.
136. Unlike, say, assault, where the individual can never be fully restored to a prior state.
137. For example, the mediator might learn the law of assault and battery.
138. See, e.g., CCMO Code, supra note 19, at 5.
139. TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 34.01 (Vernon 1992 Supp.); see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522
(1991 Cum.Supp.); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 Repl.); OKLA.STAT.
tit. 21, § 846 (1992 Supp.); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-403 (1991 Repl.).
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officials, law enforcement personnel, attorneys, clergy and dentists, 40 but not
mediators.
Although most mediators assume a duty to report, and would seem to be
included in the group by analogy, there is no general legal requirement for them
to report. 4 Most reporting laws also state that no one shall be relieved of the
duty to report because of the privileged or confidential nature of their
communications. 42 There are questions about whether the abuse is actual or
potential, and whether mediators need to have heard about the abuse from the
child. As Folberg notes, the requirements may vary for each profession. 43 In
Oregon, for example, "attorneys, psychiatrists, psychologists, and clergy need not
report child abuse if their suspicion is based solely on confidential communications
with adults; they must have direct contact with the child or a nonconfidential
Social workers and
source of suspicion before reporting is required."'"
physicians in Oregon, however, must report a suspicion of child abuse if there is
reasonable cause gained from any source. 41 Some commentators have
interpreted the Oregon requirements to mean that46"[s]ocial workers and physicians
... must report any suspicion of child abuse.''
Where the duty of mediators has been addressed, legal opinion has been
notoriously noncommittal. For example, the Attorney General of New York was
asked to rule on the obligation of mediators to report child abuse. He noted that
the statutes mandated reports from health care professionals such as physicians,
surgeons, coroners, dentists, osteopaths, and Christian Science practitioners, as
well as social workers, school officials, day care workers, peace officers, law
enforcement officers, and then concluded:
[T]hat the confidentiality provisions of the Community Dispute
Resolution Program do not bar Program mediators from reporting
evidence of child abuse which is not contained in the memoranda, work
products or case files of a mediator and which is not the subject matter
of the resolution process. Nor are Program mediators, when acting as
such, required to report such evidence as are other officials 1 47or
professionals specified in section 413 of the Social Services Law.

140. See generally Katz, Howe, & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 9
(1975).
141. See supra note 139 (comprehensive review of statutes regarding child abuse). The statutes
that I have seen allow mediators to report child abuse, but do not make reporting mandatory. See
generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-301 (2)(b); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-C:9 (1990).
142. See generally N. ROGERS & C. McEwEN, supra note 5.
143. DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 322.

144. Id. at 322-23.
145. OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1991).
146. DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACICE, supra note 26, at 322-23 (emphasis added).
147. Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen., Opinion No. 83-F17 (Dec. 30, 1983), reprinted in L. FREEDMAN, C.
HAILE & H. BOOKSTAFF, supra note 13, at 177-80.
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Barring judicial ruling, mediators do not appear to be members of the group
required to report.
The suffering involved and the inability of the victim to alter his or her
situation are significant moral distinctions in reportable abuse cases.'" I see no
moral reason why child abuse should be held as unique, since the degree of
suffering that an elderly person may endure may be effectively similar, and both
the child and the elderly person may be equally inarticulate or find it difficult to
have themselves taken seriously. 149 The policy that underlies reporting child
abuse appears to support other types of reports as well, and hence I believe that
more forms of abuse should be reportable by mediators.
X. CONFIDENTIALITY AND ETHICS
Mediators who seek to justify breaching confidentiality may be frustrated by
looking to the law or codes of conduct. I believe that it is also possible to assert
a basis for disclosure or confidentiality founded on the notion of trust. As we saw
earlier, confidentiality refers both to an act of imparting information and a special
relationship of intimacy or trust between the parties.150 Trust may be regarded
as a fundamental good. In Sissela Bok's words:
[T]rust is a social good to be protected just as much as the air we
breath or the water we drink. When it is damaged, the community as
a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter and
collapse."'
The relationship of the clients and the mediator should incorporate trust. For
example, the clients should trust that the mediator is acting in their best interests
and he or she is actively working towards a fair settlement. However, such trust
need not always equate to the mediator maintaining confidences. The parties
should trust the mediator to the extent that they acknowledge that there will be
times when it is appropriate, in the mediator's judgment, to disclose information.
I do not feel that this assumption would have a chilling effect on mediation since

148. The point is that there are two elements at work, one is that suffering is bad and should be
minimized where possible, and the second is that the affirmative force that creates a duty to report
derives from the fact that the individual is unable to mitigate that suffering himself or herself. In effect
the law adopts a stewardship role for those who lack the ability to assert their own rights.
149. Jeremy Bentham defends animal rights in a similar vein. See J. BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1988). He says:

a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more
conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month old. But suppose
they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can
they talk? but, Can they suffer?
Id. at 311 n.1.
150. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
151. S. BoK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIvATE LIFE 28 (1978).
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clients would choose a mediator with whom they feel comfortable (in the sense
that he or she is regarded as competent and credible). A focus on the trusting
relationship would also recognize the central role in mediation of the mediator's
ethical judgment.
The thought that legal precedent is more enforceable in the courts than a
moral claim is not necessarily correct. The recent Supreme Court case of Dan
Cohen v. Cowles Media Company' 52 tested arguments based on the notion of
promise-keeping against ones based on the first amendment. 53 Cohen had
released information to a newspaper conditional on a promise of anonymity.' 54
The paper published the story and listed Cohen as a source, claiming a first
amendment right to do so.' The Court held that there is a duty on those who
make promises to keep them and that statutory rights like those endowed by 5the
6
first amendment do not necessarily take precedence over moral obligations.1
A. Recommendations
Both the law and present codes of conduct seem to be inadequate in giving
guidance to the individual mediator faced with a range of problems. While we
should not expect codes to be fully adequate, they could probably be more explicit
and better formulated than they are at present. My analysis suggests that the issue
of whether or not to break confidentiality will largely fall on the judgment of the
mediator. I recognize that this may be a great burden to place on any one person,
and therefore I would make the following recommendations:
1.

2.

3.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Codes of conduct should contain language which allows greater
discretion on the part of the individual mediator. At present, the
fixed exceptions to confidentiality are too restrictive and cannot
accommodate marginal cases.
There ought to be some way to collect material about cases
(perhaps similar to a court reporter) so that mediators have
additional material for discussion and analysis. This would mean
that not every issue in mediation regarding confidentiality has to
be decided de novo.
Mediators should have some oversight mechanism which would
also provide for a second opinion; mediators should be able to
solicit guidance from a supervisor or professional organization.

111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
Id. at 2516.
Id. at 2414-15.
Id. at 2515.
Id.
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Review of cases by a third party should be instituted as a
safeguard. A case in which disclosure is clearly merited would be
less likely to be overlooked by an individual mediator if it were
subject to review.
Further training in specialized fields should be accessible or even
obligatory. At present, many mediators have no formal training or
licensure. In some states, one step toward licensure is157acceptance
by practitioners of a state-sanctioned code of ethics.

State codes of conduct, such as those in New Hampshire or Arizona15 may
contain language giving exceptions to confidentiality in the case of abuse or
felonies. Definitions of key ethical terms vary, and they are open to diverse
interpretations. Therefore mediators need to be made more aware of what
constitutes grounds for disclosure. For instance, a stipulative definition should be
given for the term "abuse."
For example, we can imagine a parent who takes the Biblical saying of
"Spare the rod and spoil the child" very literally and believes that corporal
punishment is not only an appropriate method of child discipline but that it is
divinely commanded, and he thus beats his child with the best of intentions. This
is a plausible case of child abuse. Typically, child abuse is thought of as the
presence of bruises or neglect. However, some would argue that it requires
intentional malice, which is not present in this case. 59
Hence there can be wide variations in terms which are central to making
judgments about whether or not to disclose information. Because of such
variations, mediators need to have working definitions of key terms, be aware of
the appropriate law in their field of specialization, and know the way that it is
applied. 60

157. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 328-C:1-:10 (Supp. 1991) (setting out ethical standards
for the certification of marital mediators).
158. The exceptions in the New Hampshire statute include cases where the mediator has received
"material information alleging abuse or sexual abuse or neglect [or] information about a felony or
misdemeanor, excepting adultery, that has been or is about to be committed." Id. § 328-C:9 111(c) &
(d). The Arizona Coalition on Dispute Resolution (ACDR) draft code has the exceptions of child
abuse, imminent physical harm to another person, or where disclosure is required by law. Arizona
Code of Ethics, supra note 19, at 5.
159. Black's Law Dictionarydefines "child abuse" as "Any form of cruelty to a child's physical,
moral or mental well-being." BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 289 (6th ed. 1990). If we then look up
'cruelty" we find that for an act to be cruel it has to be both intentional and malicious, conditions
which are not met in the example. Id. at 337.
160. Interestingly, in the difficult case of assessing emotional abuse, California law may move to
looking at the effects of emotional invective, since it is difficult to say what behavior actually amounts
to abuse. Interview with Robert Mnookin, Sweet Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, Falmouth,
Mass. (May 16, 1991). In practice it is easier to look to abnormal behavior or development in the
victim than it is to describe emotional abuse. I believe this sort of information is an example of what
is necessary for mediators who deal in child custody cases, for instance.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

31

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1992, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
B. Appropriate Cases For Breaching Confidence
There are four cases where I believe that the assessment of moral duty by a
mediator will indicate that he or she should break with the present code of conduct
and breach confidentiality. A common element in all the cases is that the
mediator is acting outside the strictures of the present codes of professional
conduct and is required to make a conscious moral deliberation to determine the
appropriate role-behavior.
1. Accountability
The most common case is one where there is no good reason to breach
confidentiality, except for a claim that it is in the public interest that the process
be accountable. Parties will bargain and make disclosures in the course of
negotiation. There may be an appeal for openness of the process, so that we can
ensure that individual rights are not compromised by parties bargaining in bad
faith or that there is incompetence on the part of the mediator.
Consider the hypothetical of the UnscrupulousMediator: where mediators
are not presently licensed in a given state, and an individual solicits landlord/tenant
cases based on his expertise as a lawyer.16' He allows one side, usually the
landlord, to pay for the mediation. Although he is successful in achieving
settlements, the quality of those settlements leaves much to be desired-expedient
solutions are substituted for legal entitlements, and clients, usually tenants, are
often bullied into accepting less than full redress. He makes vague reference to
legal terms and rules when advocating certain solutions and sometimes tells the
parties what sort of substantive agreement they should agree to. In a typical case,
a tenant with a vermin-infested apartment settles for rat-traps and some
poison.' 62
If the UnscrupulousMediator worked in Massachusetts his decisions would
not be subject to review. 3 Blanket confidentiality of the Massachusetts sort
which allows no review would seem to be counter-productive since by its attempt
to keep matters secret it can also serve to mask deceit, bad faith bargaining, and
coercion at the mediation table.
Completely open public reporting of the mediation session would undoubtedly
have a chilling effect on clients. While this is true, it is not necessarily pernicious,
in that oversight need not take the form of public review. Instead people may be

161. This is a original hypothetical. It shares some features with Lange v. Marshall where a
lawyer, Marshall, represented both husband and wife in a dissolution proceeding. 622 S.W.2d 237,
238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). The wife was sedated in hospital during the divorce "negotiations" and the
stipulation and joint petition for dissolution was signed the day she left the hospital. Id. She hired
another attorney and reached a more favorable settlement. Id. She then sued Marshall for his negligent
handling of her case. Id.
162. The vermin infested apartment is a case suggested by W. URY, J. BRETr & S. GOLDBERG,
GETING DIsPuTEs RESOLVED 51 (1988).
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1986); see sources cited supra note 54.
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mandated to perform such review on behalf of the general public, as is the case
in other areas.1
In one of the few discussions about the possibility of mediator
accountability," Goldberg has a character suggest that judicial review is
unworkable because "the courts are simply not equipped to provide a useful
oversight role."'6 This response may be a "red herring" in the sense that the
duty for oversight may not necessarily fall to the courts, which may lack the
structure or funding to handle such a task. Nevertheless, his argument fails on
two other counts. Initially, I feel that he misses the point, in that if mediation is
to be seen as fair and responsible to the public interest, then some sort of
oversight appears necessary. The public policy favoring mediation should be the
deciding factor in whether or not to have oversight, not the present ability of the
courts to handle more work. The fact that there are currently insufficient
resources should not in and of itself dictate a policy decision.
An analogy would be to think of John F. Kennedy saying that the United
States could not send a man to the moon because the resources were not available.
In such a case, the allocation of resources dictates public policy and it is incorrect
to claim that it is public policy allocating resources. Admittedly, in some
instances, like health care, policy decisions must pay some heed to available
resources. Still, the allocation of resources is policy driven, in that there is some
guidance in the way that priorities are set and funds are apportioned. 6 7 Thus,
in the case of mediation, if some form of review was thought to be necessary in
the interests of justice (or, perhaps, providing an adequate alternative to the formal
court system), then some form of structure could be fashioned to fulfill that
function.
Secondly, I believe Goldberg is wrong in his assumption that review will
As all court-ordered mediation agreements come
cause much more work.'
before the court, I would contend that the burden of reviewing a summary of the
process by which the settlement was reached as well as the substantive agreement
would be minimal. This kind of review may not be fully adequate; however we
should judge the benefits of any review against the risks of unscrutinized

164. See generally supra note 54. Many professions have review boards for the purposes of selfregulation. Often these are comprised of members of the professional association. Typical are the
American Bar Association for lawyers, the American Medical Association, American Hospital
Association, American Nursing Association for Health Care Workers, and the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants.
165. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, The Life of the Mediator: To Be Or Not To Be
(Accountable), in DISPUTE RESOLUTION 108-13 (1985).
166. Id. at 110.
167. Consider the way that an administration has the ability to deliberately channel funds away
publicly funded facilities which do not follow the letter of current political thinking: money could be
withheld from places that dispense advice that the administration wishes them to withhold. The
administration can also use the power of the law to enforce their policies: for example, under Rust v.
Sullivan, restrictions are permitted concerning the ability of health clinics funded under Title X to
advise patients about abortion services. 111 S. C1. 1759, 1765 (1991).
168. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 165, at 108 & 111.
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settlements which serve either or both parties badly and where there is no public
accountability.
The belief that anything less than blanket confidentiality would discourage
the public from using mediation could support a comprehensive and clear rule
preventing any disclosure.169 There are two responses to this claim. First, a
clear dictum may still require individual judgment in its implementation; for
example, the apparently clear statement "publish the best paper" still requires
interpretation by the editorial staff. Second, totally categorical rules are extremely
rare in any process, and indeed the Massachusetts example is an anomaly which
might allow abuses by actually being so unqualified.1 71 In addition, whatever
savings that result from lower administrative costs and fewer internal difficulties
for a program are likely to be offset by clients who are discouraged from using
the program by the very rigidity of the rules. For instance, the Massachusetts
program does not even allow for the qualifications found in standard expositions
of lawyer-client privileges, and some potential clients might be deterred by the
apparent simplicity and unreflective nature of the program rules.
Moreover, there is more to considerations about client welfare than costs
alone, since a process which is unfair or not responsible to the public at large does
not foster benefit. I contend that extra costs involved by review would be
worthwhile in two ways. First, the credibility of the process could be called into
question without it, and hence review is effectively an insurance policy for the
process. Secondly, the benefits of reviewing the quality of the process are likely
to outweigh the costs. Mediation may cost more, but it would be a better process
as a result.
2. Threats
Consider the hypothetical case of The ThreateningHusband: where during
the course of a divorce mediation the ex-husband makes a threat. 7' The
marriage broke up because the wife became involved with someone else. During
a one-on-one discussion with the mediator about child custody, the ex-husband,
a security guard, becomes agitated and yells that if he sees his children with his
wife's lover he will shoot him. The mediator asks the husband if the threat is real
or an expression of anger. The husband replies that he has a temper and the

169. Anecdotally, I have heard mediators make opening statements which include phrases such
as "anything said in this session is entirely confidential." Sometimes the statement is modified to one
which uses the qualifier "within the limits of the law." Although clients rarely question what those
limits might be, an opening statement which included a list of potential reasons for disclosure might
be construed as having a chilling effect on the process. I am not persuaded that a more qualified
statement would be a disincentive for parties to mediate. See, e.g., N. ROGERs & R. SALEM, supra.
note 15, at 67-68; supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
170. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23C. The statute reads "[aill memoranda, and work
product prepared by a mediator ... shall be confidential and not subject to disclosure in any judicial
or administrative proceeding involving any of the parties to any mediation." Id.
171. This is an original hypothetical.
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thought of seeing his children accompanied by another man makes him "real
mad." The mediator is left wondering whether the statement constitutes a real
threat, and whether the threat invokes a duty to warn. One difference between this
case and Tarasoff is the vagueness of the threat and the consequent uncertainty on
the part of the mediator about whether it constitutes a case of "imminent
172
harm."
There are several possible courses of action open to the mediator: (1) ask
the husband to repeat the threat to the wife; (2) ask permission from the husband
to restate the threat; (3) tell the wife anyway; (4) break off the mediation; or (5)
report the threat to "the authorities"-presumably the police. Present practice, as
governed by codes of conduct, might suggest that the mediator should ask
1 73
permission to repeat in the joint session what was said privately in caucus.
If permission is not given, the mediator has the discretion to end the
mediation.174 However, as the threat was neither specific nor imminent there
appears to be no duty to warn.
I believe that a reasonable person would acknowledge that mediation ought
to be halted when words or acts rise to the level of a threat, and the case is serious
and exceptional enough not to damage a policy which supports the mediation
process in general. 75 Thus, I contend that just as the present sort of
introductory remarks that a mediator makes at the beginning of a joint session
contain qualification clauses which announce that child abuse will be reported do
not appear to deter clients in general, 76 there would be few negative effects
from a clause which tells disputants that threats will also result in the breach of
confidentiality. A possible consequence of this kind of introductory remark will
be to discourage those who know that they are likely to make threats.
Once a threat has been made, I feel that the mediator has a responsibility to
the potential victim to let him or her know about it, and allow the potential victim

172. See supra note 135 (comments on Tarasoff).
173. See, e.g., CCMO Code, supra note 19, at 5. The Colorado Council of Mediation
Organizations Code states that "[i]nformation received in caucus is not to be revealed in joint session
without receiving prior permission from the party or person from whom the information was received."
Id.
174. See id. Under several of the codes, the mediator has a duty to stop the mediation process
if it does not appear to be advancing to a workable settlement or there is bargaining in bad faith. See,
e.g., id.
175. A possible exception is the case where the mediator believes that there will be greater
benefits through continuing the mediation than by terminating it. Perhaps the husband could agree to
some conditions involving self-restraint. In general, though, I am taking a threat to be evidence that
the mediation is not productive and unlikely to reach cooperative settlement.
176. The claim that "the only people who may be deterred are those who are deterred" may well
be self-verifying, of course. Yet the point is valid - assuming the cases that would be reported are
unusual then the number of potential clients who would withdraw prior to mediation would also be
small. (This would hold even if there were a perception that the number and type of cases that would
be reported were greater than it actually would be.) The only evidence that would be pertinent here
is the perceptions of those who choose not to enter mediation and those who do. The vast majority
of cases continue even after an introduction by the mediator which says that child abuse cases will be
reported. I believe the same would hold true if the introduction included a specific reference to threats.
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to then choose what to do with the information. Thus, a threat made in the
presence of a mediator will most likely result in a breach of confidentiality,
whether the report is made to the victim directly, or to a responsible agency. This
conclusion allows the mediator greater discretion than he or she has at present by
slavishly following a code-the mediator may report a greater range of cases, but
only after conscious moral deliberation.
3. Reports of Crime or Abuse
In discussions between joint owners of a family business, one brother
intimates that he suspects that the mother, who is in a private nursing home, is
being neglected, perhaps because she is left unattended for long periods of time
and has bed sores. Although the allegations are not material to the negotiations,
the allegation has been made in the presence of the mediator, and the mediator is
presented with the issue of the Neglected Mother.177
Strictly speaking, the allegations do not concern the mediator, since they refer
to a person not represented and not affected by the mediation. The mediator
might suggest, without any ethical conflict, that the case be investigated by the
parties to the mediation. However, we can imagine that some individuals would
not take the allegation seriously, or might not agree to an investigation for other
reasons.
Even if the parties themselves wish to ignore the allegation, the mediator may
think that a particular case ought to be investigated, and it appears that he or she
is foreclosed from pursuing the allegation under the codes of conduct.1 78 This
is not to say that the mediator should have an obligation to follow through on
every rumor that surfaces in mediation. Rather, it suggests that the mediator
should be able to make considered judgments about the substance of the allegation
and initiate an investigation if he or she believes it to be appropriate.
Such an investigation need not be performed by the mediator personally,
rather, the allegations need to be substantiated and then a report made. Ideally,
the mediator would give the responsibility of dealing with the allegation back to
the party who made it. However, if the party is unwilling or unable to take the
responsibility, then the mediator would have to take it upon him or herself to
report the allegation, initially to a supervisor, and if necessary to appropriate
outside agencies like the social services.

177. This is an original hypothetical.
178. See CCMO Code, supra note 19. The closest reference in the Colorado Council of Mediators
and Mediation Organizations Code, for example, asserts that:
the mediation process may include a responsibility of the mediator to assert the interest
of the public or other unrepresented parties in order that a particular dispute be settled;
that costs or damages be alleviated; and that normal life be resumed. Mediators should
question agreements that are not in the interest of the public or other unrepresented parties
whose interests and needs should be and are not being considered.
Id. at 11 (the focus is on the relevance of the information to any potential settlement, and that the
mediator only has the duty to raise issues to the parties at the table, but need do nothing else).
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Essentially, what I am advocating here is nothing more or less than treating
allegations of serious harm similarly to the way that child abuse is presently
treated in mediation. 79 The rationale is that the overall greatest welfare will
come about if mediators are willing to break confidentiality, even on behalf of
someone not in, or affected by, the mediation itself.
We can contrast the position of the mediator in this incident with that of the
attorney or social worker. Under their canons of professional responsibility,
attorneys should not break client confidences for the advantage of a third party,
unless the client consents after full disclosure.se Thus, in the present case the
brothers may not give permission for an attorney to follow through on the
allegation, perhaps because it would involve embarrassing revelations. If
permission is not granted, then the attorney has no right to reveal what was
imparted during a confidential session. Even though an attorney may disclose
information about an imminent crime, he or she may only reveal sufficient
information to prevent a crime that his or her client intends to commit.""
Social workers have more discretion in what they may report. In their code
of conduct the wording suggests that there may be cases when it is appropriate to
break confidentiality. 2 It states:
The social worker should respect the privacy of clients and hold in
confidence all information obtained in the course of professional service
.... The social worker should share with others confidences revealed
by clients, without their consent, only for compelling professional
83
reasons.1

179. 1 am taking "serious harm" to mean physical or psychological treatment of a person which
causes lasting damage. Although this widens the scope of reportable cases somewhat, I do not think
it would result in many more reports; accounts of threats of bodily harm are rare in mediation, as are
allegations of child abuse.
180. See M. PIRio & K. KIRWIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY 559
(West 1976) (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBItuTY DR 4-101(c)(3)).
181. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (b)(1) (1989). David Luban, for one,
has argued for a less strict standard of attomey-client confidences in his book Lawyers and Justice:
an Ethical Study. He believes that justifications based on a criminal suit paradigm may not always be
appropriate in civil cases. D. LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988). He states:
less clear cases raise messy and difficult questions of line-drawing; they are judgment
calls. But that is always true in moral deliberation-and my point is simply that moral
deliberation, not a rule of confidentiality based on specious analogies with the criminal
defense situation, must determine what to do.
Id. at 205. 1 believe much the same line of argument applies to confidentiality in mediation.
182. NATIONAL Ass'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, INC., CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 165
(1986) (citing NATIONAL ASS'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS INC., CODE OF ETHICS § H).
183. Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus a social worker may report abuse to a third party given sufficient
justification, but is not obliged to. 184 I believe that a similar standard should
operate for mediators, so that they are not foreclosed from reporting crimes or
abuse which they may discover in the course of mediation.
The practical implication is that the seal of confidentiality around the
negotiating table will be broken in a few additional cases; however, the significant
change is that mediators will be allowed to use their professional judgment in
difficult cases rather than having to follow the Code to the letter.
4. Whistleblowing
A mediator is involved in negotiations between a supplier and contractor.
During the talks, the mediator discovers that there will be some toxic chemicals
which need disposal and the clients agree to use a contact of the manufacturer who
has a way of dealing with toxics "no questions asked." This hypothetical is the
case of Suspicious Waste Disposal.'5 The mediator announces that she cannot
be party to anything illegal and complicity in any illegal dumping would be
equivalent to betraying the public trust in the mediation process. She is assured
that she should not worry, since although the public might not approve, the contact
will do nothing illegal. The supplier and contractor further hint that the waste will
be "going south."
In this case, the mediator faces the conflict between retaining confidentiality
in mediation and letting the public know about a deal that may be legal, but is
probably unfair to unrepresented parties. To break confidentiality would
effectively be a form of "whistleblowing," or calling a foul upon one's own
enterprise for the general good. It is sometimes argued that mediators should be
indifferent to the settlements that parties may come to. However, I believe that
given careful consideration, there may be cases where whistleblowing is
appropriate.
The balance which the mediator must determine is the same that any
whistleblower must gauge-the utility of his or her product in local and general
terms. Here the mediator is helping to produce an agreement that may be in the
interests of his or her employers-the disputants-but against the public interest.
Claims that whistleblowing is inappropriate to mediation have two elements:
one that suggests that the merits in any individual case are outweighed by the

184. See AMERIcAN BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1967).

In that work we

find Informal Rule No. 929 to Canon 37 which reads:
If confidential communications are received by a lawyer in connection with his duties as
counsel for a social welfare agency, he may include such information in his report to the
agency. However, if such communications were received by the lawyer after he had
received an individual client by referral from the agency, then the communications would
be privileged and should not be disclosed to anyone without the approval of the individual
client.
Id. at 172.
185. This is an original hypothetical.
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potential damage to the process in general, and an associated claim that a mediator
has a duty to preserve the mediation process. The belief that revelations from one
particular case damages mediation has been popularized by the wording in
Tomlinson which suggests that the benefit in particular cases would be outweighed
because testimony by a mediator would "seriously impair," or even "destroy" the
usefulness of the Conciliation Service.18 6
However, it is wrong simply to generalize from Tomlinson. In this one case,
the court decided that the balance favored confidentiality, but we have seen that
8 7
the balance may be decided in favor of
in other cases, such as Rittenhouse,1
disclosure. Furthermore, this dispute, unlike Tomlinson, is not a labor dispute and
may not be protected in the same way as labor negotiations.'88
The second argument suggests that a mediator should remain loyal to the
mediation process.189 Yet, using this form of words is nothing more than
hypostatization, where an abstract entity is treated as concrete. Thus, although
grammatically correct, it makes no sense to speak of "loyalty to a process." What
the phrase means, properly interpreted, is that mediators are dedicated to the ends
of the mediation process, things like wise, efficient settlements which allow a
continuing relationship. Given this interpretation, there is no reason for a mediator
to hold confidentiality as sacred, but rather it should been seen as a means to an
end. Consequently, if mediation is likely to result in an unfair agreement, there
should be no compulsion to hang on to confidentiality as an end-in-itself.
In making a determination about the utility of whistleblowing, it is useful to
Bok's considerations are important
draw on an analysis by Sissela Bok.'
because:
Dissent by whistleblowers . ..is expressly claimed to benefit the
public. It carries with it, as a result, an obligation to consider the nature
of this benefit and to consider also the possible harm that may come
from speaking out: harm to persons or institutions, and, ultimately, to
the public interest itself. Whistleblowers must, therefore, begin by
making every effort to consider the effects of speaking out versus those
of remaining silent. 9'
She suggests that there are three elements to whistleblowing: dissent, breach of
loyalty, and accusation. 92 In each area, the whistleblower must examine the

186. Tomlinson, 74 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 688.
187. See Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 339.
188. See Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 56 (note especially the context-bound phrase in Macaluso: "labor
mediation is essential to continued industrial stability, a public interest sufficiently great to outweigh
the interest in obtaining every person's evidence.").
189. The Colorado Council of Mediation Organizations Code has this connotation when it speaks
of "Responsibility of the Mediator to the Mediation Process". CCMO Code, supra note 19, at 2-8.
190. Bok, Whistleblowing and ProfessionalResponsibility, 11 N.Y.U. EDUC. Q. 2 (1980).
191. Id. at 5.
192. Id. at 3.
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consequences of his or her act and determine whether breaching confidentiality
193
will be worth the personal and professional costs that it is likely to incur.
Whistleblowing is motivated by dissent. Unless there is a disagreement on
some factual matter or likely outcome, there is no reason to "go public."
Therefore, it is incumbent on the whistleblower, Bok suggests, to check the
accuracy of the information. 19 4 A mediator has a duty to be loyal to the clients
and thus any breach of that loyalty must be a last resort, meaning exhaustion of
all the standard means available to address the problem. 95 Moreover, because
the purpose of whistleblowing is to motivate the audience to some reaction or
change, the charges have to be credible, specific, pertinent and timely. 19 There
must also be a direct causal link between those accused and the problem. Further,
the motives for the breach must be open and defensible, so that it is clear that the
mediator is not acting from personal malice or for selfish reasons.
Thus, we find that the conditions for whistleblowing are quite restrictive. In
most instances the whistleblower will have to make an assessment of the potential
benefit and harms that his or her actions may cause and will be acting in the
absence of full information.
Codes of conduct do not provide neat algorithms for all cases in any
circumstances and so they are necessarily indeterminate. Even within a code,
there will be latitude for personal decisions. Obligatory disclosure is a function
of the codes of ethics that are established for mediation.' 97 Permissible
disclosure is a function of the beliefs and values of the individual mediator and it
is incumbent on the mediator to inform his or her clients of the approach and
standards that will be used in the mediation process.1 98
A concern is that clients who live immoral lives may come to mediation to
sort out a dispute that is, in itself, innocent. Perhaps the operators of two "crack
houses" have a dispute about their property line. By my analysis the clients are
at risk of being reported by the mediator, and thus immoral disputants may be
driven to other means of resolving their differences, like violence. I see this as
a genuine difficulty. One possible solution is that the mediator may whistle-blow
but is not obliged to do so. We can imagine some mediators having a professional
specialty in resolving disputes between unsavory characters with the understanding
that only imminent harm and abuse will be reported.
From the mediator's perspective, we find the number of possible cases where
confidentiality may be breached has enlarged. Nevertheless, special considerations
apply, and as with whistleblowing cases in general there is an expectation that the
cases would be exceptional and the potential harm serious and of immediate

193. Id. at 5.
194. Id.
195. For example, a mediator might allow the parties every opportunity of disclosing information
themselves in their own way prior to the information being released by the mediator.
196. Bok, supra note 190, at 3.
197. See generally R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDIcAL ETHics (1981).
198. See generally id.
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concern to the public. Moreover, mediators will have differing attitudes about
which cases are sufficiently harmful and therefore requiring reporting. Even
though we cannot expect mediators to give a before-the-fact listing of such cases,
it is nevertheless possible for them to give general statements about their particular
approach and attitudes which would indicate their personal values.'
I believe these factors would make whistleblowing cases sufficiently unusual
so that ordinary potential mediation clients would not be discouraged from using
the process. Still, the whistleblowing provision does give the mediator a set of
conditions where breaching confidentiality would be acceptable, whatever the letter
of the law might be.
XI. CONCLUSION
I have looked at the nature and limits of mediator confidentiality. The role
behavior of the mediator is governed by present codes of conduct, and these in
turn are largely based on a patchwork of the present law. In examining the law,
we found that there are several suppositions which support confidentiality.
However, mediation confidentiality is only as strong as the justifications that can
be made on its behalf. There are two elements that are crucial for a mediator
deciding whether or not he or she should break confidentiality in apparent
disregard of the present codes: one is the policy element which supports the
institution of mediation and the related role obligation; the second is the
mediator's own ethical judgment. For example some mediators may believe that
they not only have duties to the disputants, but also to unrepresented third parties.
There are two implications of my analysis. One is that some form of review
of the mediation process is in order so that there is public accountability. Such
an oversight mechanism may take the form of review by a supervisor or external
party who would be able to make recommendations about the correct course of
action in any given case. If mediation is to mature and become a publicly
sanctioned alternative dispute resolution mechanism, I believe that the only way
earn the public trust is by being accountable to the public and here I suggest
expert review of the process as well as the substantive agreements. One way to
build in safeguards while maintaining the maximum degree of confidentiality
would be to allow an expert to conduct confidential outside review and to allow
that person to make an advisory report. Thus mediation would have adequate or
accountable confidentiality rather than it being absolute. The reviewer might be
a mediator external to the case or a formal or informal supervisor. Adequate
confidentiality would be something less than what may be indicated by statute, but
it simultaneously satisfies the interests of both sides by providing safeguards
without compromising the ability of clients to speak freely. Once again, this
would have costs associated with any form of review process, which would
probably make the process more expensive and less efficient.

199. Many lawyers still do something similar when they offer an initial free consultation during
which they espouse their personal beliefs.
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The other implication is that the policy behind mediation, or certain types of
mediation, should be made more explicit and the duties of the mediator to retain
confidences as a result of that policy need to be examined more closely. One
practical result of this would be to broaden the language used in the codes of
conduct in order to allow mediators to make their own considered judgments in
the light of the underlying policy about what may or must be disclosed.
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